1st of June - Wednesday Special

Regarding the huge amount of air strikes flown that battle, what (if any) were the most important lessons learned by the flight deck crews of the american (and if possible) japanese carriers? And were they noticed or integrated in the respective doctrines?

Reichsbierminister

Can John comment on the US Navy submarine screen off Midway and in particular the USS Nautilus contact with the Japanese on June 4.

which Midway are we referring to, the battle, the carrier, or the recent movie?

Fechteler's fickle fictile fettler, fourth finest fettler Fechteler forged for foriegn fictile fettling forays..

ALSO, love the book, have given it out to many of my friends as a gift since it's truly one of the must reads for any history reader. Shattered Sword in top 5 books of all time.

if the 5th carrier division was there, Shokaku and Zuikaku, would they have not just suffered the same fate as the other carrier groups given that surprise was near total. \

Early in WWII, US carrier doctrine was for distinct task forces centered on single carriers, while the IJN's was for pairs of carriers in fleet formation. Was Midway proof that the US's doctrine was the better one, inasmuch as their air attacks were able to take down multiple decks all at once, while the Japanese strikes were only able to hit single carriers at a time -- and indeed, the same carrier, Yorktown, both times?

Glenn Ricafrente

Why did the ijn coverup the loss

Did the US re-evaluate their use of high altitude bombing against shipping after the failures at Midway?

What lessons did the IJN learn from the Battle of Midway?

What, in your opinion, was the IJN's greatest doctrinal, operational and tactical failings that lead to the disaster they suffered? It seems to me that damage control and perhaps fighter direction we're up there. Am I right? (or wrong?) what other aspects of their performance were major contributory factors?

SPRNinja

Sorry to raise a "what if" question, but although mixing carriers and airgroups was against policy, it was possible for the IJN to have had five fleet carriers at Midway. Did they think it was unnecesary because of "Victory Disease?"

How much information was deciphered by U.S. naval intelligence about the Japanese plans to attack Midway. Did that give U. S. enough knowledge to formulate a battle plan to counter this attack and what do you believe the U. S. Admirals felt was their probability of success of at least blunting the strike force to make it combat ineffective and force the Japanese to withdraw.

David Stange Jr