Why the Pacers aren't getting off to a running start

Exploring why a team that nearly led the league in pace last season is still stuck in the middle of the pack

By: Caitlin Cooper I @C2_Cooper

It's Game 1 of the Eastern Conference Finals and Al Horford has just missed a free throw. As Obi Toppin launches himself up in the air for the rebound, Tyrese Haliburton takes a quick peek over his shoulder, glancing down the floor in search of what passes might be possible rather than staring down the outlet pass he already knows is coming. For him, and the play-style of the team that he embodies, there's not a second to waste, even to the point of (quite literally and intentionally) taking his eyes off the ball.

Still, just because the wheels in his head are turning at warp speed, doesn't necessarily guarantee that the offense will be in a mad dash. The moving parts around him also have to turn tail and run, being long and explosive with their first three steps before rapidly unveiling the method in their fastness.

For the most part, their spacing template is position-less. The first two players back are instructed to find the nearest sideline and sprint to the corners.

Meanwhile, the last player back sprints to half-court and then delays to fill at the 45, looking over their inside shoulder for the potential early and opposite hit-ahead pass, as the five-man and/or trailer fills dead center.

From there, with Haliburton at the controls, the ball typically gets advanced with the pass instead of the dribble, as the star guard finished last season as the league's leader in advance passes per 100 possessions, per Second Spectrum.

If he can't float the ball over the top of the defense, he immediately starts processing the progressions of what the defense is trained to take away. Normally, in transition, the closest player to the ball-handler is responsible for stopping the ball. Conversely, whoever is farthest from the ball, which preferably will be the first big back, is going to protect the basket. At the same time, it's the job of the next nearest player who is ball-side, to plug the ball-side hit-ahead pass. If that player doesn't get there, however, Haliburton makes that spot his first option, almost as though he's passing off the baton to the next ball-handler for the subsequent leg of the race.

When the player in that position was Buddy Hield, he would fire away even when vastly outnumbered, shooting as though he preferred to ask forgiveness later rather than risking delay and seeking permission. After he was traded, that calculus changed along with the geometry of the floor, as that player would typically make a bum rush to the rim as opposed to erupting like a geyser. In that sense, the goal is to punch-and-spray, pushing ahead with the dribble until the defense stops them. Here, Myles Turner is available for the drop-off pass to catch, step, and slam, but the benefit of this spacing template is that there is also a two-side fast-break on the left side of the floor.

If Nembhard had thrown a strike to Toppin's shooting pocket at the 45, that likely would've forced two separate closeouts, with Sam Merrill scurrying out to that spot and opening up the one-more, extra pass to Aaron Nesmith in the corner for a big advantage shot. Needless to say, the aim is to self-regulate based on the defense, making quick, unscripted reads that are enhanced by the guidelines of the spacing and made possible by the commitment to run.

As the cliché goes, the "game slows down in the playoffs," but the Pacers racked up over 100 possessions in that game against the eventual-NBA Champions and only attempted 18.2 percent of their shots during the final seven seconds of the shot-clock. Now, in what was a random Wednesday of November basketball, the Blue & Gold only logged 97 possessions against the Orlando Magic at Kia Center, with 22.6 percent of their shots coming during the final seven seconds, including 15.5 percent which were effectively launched as ticking-time bombs at four seconds or less. For frame of reference, the Brooklyn Nets are currently hoisting the highest percentage of their shots in that "very late" range of the shot-clock (4-0), at 13.2 percent. That means, the Pacers played later against the Magic than even the latest team in the league, as they failed to score over 90 points for the second time in less than a week, which never occurred in 82 games last season.

And, here's the thing: For the Pacers, when looking at their performance from the field on the season during each range of the shot-clock, earlier shots in transition hold more value.

• Very Early (24-18 seconds): 59.4 percent

• Early/Average (18-7 seconds): 48.9 percent

• Late (7-0 seconds): 35.8 percent

Put simply, the Pacers are better when they play fast, which was likely harder to do when already playing the same opponent for the third time to start the season -- especially since said opponent currently boasts the second-best defense in the league in terms of points allowed per 100 possessions. Still, it wasn't just the Magic's length at the rim and lateral size in their 2-2-1 press dropping back to 2-3 zone that turned the offense to sludge, the Pacers also had a hand in the slow churn all their own as they oscillated between charging into crowds and dragging their feet -- sometimes, with one begetting the other.

Just look at this possession from the end of the third quarter and note the difference in spacing as well as the fact that Haliburton is galloping to control his speed at half-court in reaction to the slower transition reaction from his teammates. For maximum impact, this has to be a sprint -- not a light jog.

Additionally, what this highlights is that this isn't the same roster that closed last season or even started this season. As was pointed out following the win over Dallas, Toppin and Siakam possess the size and speed necessary to pressure the opponent's transition defense and attack the rim first with high seals and run-outs. In that case, though, Toppin has a cross-match against Anthony Black and he neither stays and holds with a high seal, maintaining space between himself and the rim to create a catch area for Haliburton to throw the ball over the top into, nor does he simply find the nearest sideline and sprint to the corner. As a result, in contrast to the possession from Game 1 against Boston, there is no opportunity for a ball-side hit-ahead pass, as Siakam is also simultaneously running to the rim without a trailer.

With no one to pitch the ball back to at the top of the key or flow into secondary offense, Haliburton has to motion for Siakam to come back out of the paint to set a long-run ball-screen.

That's a problem for two reasons: 1) The clock is already at 15 seconds before the Pacers have even run their first action, and 2) During the time it takes to cover all of that ground again, the screener defender also has plenty of opportunity to call out the coverage. In effect, this is a nightmare against Orlando's defense, which was once again hyper-aggressive at overplaying Haliburton's right hand. In fact, anytime the screener approached to screen for him on his right, the bench could be heard yelling, "Keep him there!" as a directive to weak him toward the left side of the floor.

Beyond forcing him to dribble with his left, an advantage of forcing Haliburton to his weak hand in the pick-and-roll is the ability of the on-ball defender to contest his floater when he raises up with his right hand to shoot. As a result, more often than not, this type of coverage will shoo him out of those shots.

In the end, McConnell does well to salvage the possession by cutting off the back-side of Jarace Walker to create the angle for the drop-off pass, but the shot doesn't leave his hands until there's less than four seconds on the shot-clock, which is telling. Likewise, in addition to the change in "runners" and running patterns, it's also difficult to run when there's only one point guard on the floor and the pick-up point for that point guard is this high.

Granted, Turner at least tried to change the angle of the screen so that Haliburton could still access it and snake middle, but they were both standing on the logo as the shot-clock was about to turn red, perhaps giving new meaning to the phrase "seven seconds or less."

This happened over and over again in the second half, as here Turner can even be seen setting a screen at half-court, which Jalen Suggs simply ducked under (twice!), before sending Haliburton back to his left and (ultimately) off the ball.

For anyone who might still be wondering, this is why the Pacers closed the last game in Orlando with him starting possessions away from the ball and either hunting interior mismatches or running actions that were designed to free him up like a shooting guard. To be fair, he could've been more active in that game to shake himself loose with misdirection cuts, and the off-ball screens didn't always exactly stick to the point of creating an advantage, but the reason why he wasn't handling as much, while he also continues to work his way through whatever has been holding him back, should at least be clearer in retrospect.

All of which is to say that, some of what's holding him back (and the team back) goes back to that possession from Game 1 of the Eastern Conference Finals. Despite returning most of the same faces, this isn't the same team -- not only due to injuries and unfamiliar lineups but also in how they are going about getting out of the blocks.

Here, Haliburton gets a reprieve from handling against pressure, but no one is exactly sprinting to either corner, which perhaps can be excused from Siakam given the amount of weight he is having to carry in the half-court; however, part of the reason he is having to carry so much weight in the half-court, is because the floor balance in transition, well, too often looks like this.

As the five-man, Turner typically fills dead center, but when the ball is being advanced up the middle of the floor, rather than the sideline, he needs to delay his trail to avoid jamming up the ball-handler's penetration push. Instead, four players end up on the same side of the floor, when ideally, Turner would stay behind the ball and simply flow into a drag screen with the middle player on the three-side emptying to the opposite corner.

As it was, the middle player would technically be Haliburton, but the preferred outcome would've been Haliburton staying high at the nail with Walker cutting at the 45. Of course, that would've required sprinting not jogging, as Walker is neither changing his pace to stay in line with the ball, nor actively looking to resolve the fact that multiple players are on the same side of the floor. Consequently, the ad lib into an uphill hand-off in the opposite direction of the basket between Mathurin and Haliburton went about exactly how an uphill hand-off in the opposite direction of the basket should be expected to go.

To Mathurin's credit, he scored 12 points in the quarter, including a running three and a running layup, in which he finished 2-on-1 after getting a head of steam going downhill, but that's also sort of reinforces the point: when the game got shorter, the Pacers needed to play faster -- not slower. In the end, that applied not only to speed in the open floor, but also the speed within possessions, as a zero-pass, stare down three ended up being the shot they got, down four with 40 seconds to play, after the ball got knocked out of bounds out of that uphill hand-off.

The ongoing issues with grabbing rebounds and corralling loose balls along with the lack of downhill gumption against zone certainly didn't help; however, the very presence of long-run ball screens, which rarely would've been seen a year ago, and the exaggerated coverages that are leading to higher pick-up points and longer possessions, should at least somewhat bring to question whether the floor balance, quick decision-making, and extended ball pressure that once allowed them to make a run for it in the playoffs can be replicated in the long run to the same extent this season for a team that is now experiencing the growing pains of running behind and, in this game, all too often late.