On a "Part Two" of the Meta Model by sleepingirl

The Meta Model of NLP was first formally introduced in 1975, before the term “Neuro Linguistic Programming” even existed. As we’ve discussed, NLP has evolved in a fairly complicated way over the years, contributed to by many practitioners with many different perspectives. As it became more clear that the Meta Model was just the foundations of the practice, not the whole, what happened to it? Did it change, or become expanded?

It’s impossible to fully categorize exactly what the Meta Model “is” in its current state -- that’s sort of a misunderstanding, as there is no objective standard for the various parts of NLP. And as NLP grew, the lines between its various parts and categories have seemingly become more blurred. But we can explore some key additions that are particularly relevant to our understanding of NLP as a whole and our hypnokinky practice.

Where Did This Come From?

Among other sources, this article is synthesizing some contents from a book called “Communication Magic” (2001) by L. Michael Hall. It was written 25 years after the original Meta Model was proposed and was an intentional “update” to the practice. (Hall writes elsewhere that Bandler originally asked for the two of them to co-author it, and they worked on it together, but ultimately Bandler took his name off of it because he “...got upset with [Hall] for something and so refused! Such is life with geniuses!”)

NLP is largely a practice that draws from sources that draw from sources that draw from sources. Hall got involved some time after the Meta Model’s inception but was fascinated by Bandler and Grinder’s remark in “The Structure of Magic” that Alfred Korzybski’s theories “...will be particularly useful in expanding the Meta-Model further.” He dug more into Korzybski’s General Semantics and fulfilled this statement, adding it to many of the other important players and concepts in the world of psychology, hypnosis, and linguistics. We will be particularly focused on a few of these additions from Korzybski and others that inform the way we should think about communication, especially within the context of hypnosis as a communicative practice.

Cognitive Aspects of the Meta Model

Hall takes care to emphasize that the “magic” in the Meta Model’s analysis of language comes from this idea that words are associative and representative, not only in a singular way but in a contextual one. He quotes Robert Dilts as writing, “A word is worth a thousand pictures.” What they mean is that a single word -- for example, “peach,” -- carries individual weight for people; there may be the literal images or other sensory experiences of a peach, different memories of when they were eating one, processing peaches as part of a higher class of fruit or food, and much more.

We can think of the hypnotic concept of anchors or triggers -- words designed to elicit a specific response through association. But really, all words carry this sort of power, and beyond. Every word we hear, read, or speak causes us to process in a unique way -- this is part of how we can be hypnotically effective. The Meta Model says that words are representations of our “maps,” which should tell us that there is a lot of information to be gleaned from what a person is processing from them.

Macro versus Micro

The Meta Model has a reputation for being investigative, made clear by its nature of encouraging questioning and clarification. But what are we investigating, especially when we as hypnokinksters are working somewhat outside the therapeutic context that the Meta Model originally came from? 

From a macro level, the Meta Model seeks to achieve goals and change, so the deductions that are being made are being made for the specific purpose of giving the person the ability to move in a desired direction. But if we break that down, it’s about discerning the qualities of the map. For an example in hypnokink, a problem-solving model might look like the hypnotist trying to achieve the goal of turning their partner into a doll. On a micro scale, the Meta Model gives us the foundation to discover lots of things related to this goal: what is the nature of the subject’s map related to this? How do they categorize the experience of being a doll? Is it inherently erotic, or how does it connect to the idea of eroticism? Do they relate it to previous memories, and what were those like? Does “doll” have contextual meaning within different frames of reference for them?

These are all relevant questions, but it’s important to realize that this idea of problem solving and deduction is only one angle that we can look at. If we expand even further, it’s not necessarily about using the Meta Model to clarify and specify -- it’s simply about understanding how someone processes these things to be able to utilize them, and you don’t have to follow a specific procedure to get this information. Using generalizations, deletions, and distortions is a normal part of human processing, and sometimes the right choice isn’t to “fix” those. Let’s look at a fictional example:

In the heat of the moment within a scene, a short lull between trances.

Hypnotist: You look so fucked.

Subject: Yeah… Yeah. I feel like… I can barely move.

H: That’s so good. You look like a doll.

S: Fuck…

H: That something that resonates right now?

S: Yes… I feel… just like an object...

The information that someone thinks about “dollplay” within the larger context of feeling like an object (generalizing) gives you a lot of tools -- you then have a broad reference to draw from and an easy time to link concepts. This idea of creating connections between “frames” or contexts is an indispensable hypnotic tool. Let’s see how this could play out:

H: Mhmm, a very pretty object… Objects don’t have will, do they? Like, that’s one of the defining features of being an object, that they aren’t even necessarily conscious of the impulse to act -- it just happens. Say, ‘yes.’

S: Yes…

H: That’s right. And what is a dolly except for a really specific kind of object? We could talk all about the kinds of qualities that objects have; no control, not really much awareness… And dollies are, like, pretty objects. Like, a doll is just a kind of object that exists to be played with, exists to be looked at. Say, ‘yes.’

S: Yes...

This sort of surface exploration of the way that someone connects concepts can be taken as far as we like, and it should serve to get us thinking about twisting the Meta Model from a simple tool to ask questions and solve problems into something more hypnotic, or even how we can use it backwards. NLP accounts for this -- we’ll be learning about a well-known permutation, the Milton Model, in another essay.

Chunking

This leads us into a concept in NLP that is often talked about adjacently to the Meta Model -- “chunking.” Chunking is essentially the idea that we categorize information in certain ways. It’s most easily understood by example, and here’s a well-known one: a chunk of information might be the idea of a car. A car, in some frames of reference, could belong to a broader category of automobiles; this is called “chunking up.” If you want to “chunk down,” you could think about the different parts of the car, like the steering wheel or the seats. There is also the idea of “chunking laterally,” where you consider things that are like cars, for example, a bus.

Chunking isn’t an objective practice. It is based on using metaphor and reference frames of how we think about different things at different times. You could also “chunk up” a car to think about the broader class of “things that get you where you want to go,” in which case, a horse might be considered a lateral or equivalent chunk. Note that if you think about a car specifically within the context of “vehicle,” horse might not come to mind.

In the example about the doll-like subject, we learned that there was some belongingness of “doll” to the higher chunk of “object” for them. As hypnotists, we can ask ourselves things like, “What else belongs to the ‘object’ frame of reference that I can connect to? What are smaller aspects of ‘dolls’ that I can draw upon to narrow focus? What language are we both using that might be changing the reference point of what ‘doll’ represents?”

Perhaps you can think about a chunk in the middle of “doll” and “object” that doll belongs to: “toy.” By simply using that word, which again carries a lot of power and connotation, you shift the frame of reference and allow both of you to consider what is involved in being a toy (chunking down); toys have owners, toys have a purpose of being played with, toys bring delight, toys are whimsical, whatever suits the situation.

There is not a necessarily right or wrong way to chunk information -- it’s more about how well you can “sell” it. It’s probably an easy path for many people to get from “doll” to “toy.” But consider how you might get from “doll” to “pet.” Does it have to do with analyzing certain qualities (like ownership) and drawing parallels? Does it have to do with changing the reference frame to simply think about a higher class of erotic activities?

Meta States

That to-from concept of chunking is only one way that this idea of changing frames is relevant. Hall, Bandler, Grinder, and many others have all separately referenced a concept that has to do with thinking on a more “meta” level. In the second volume of “The Structure of Magic,” Bandler and Grinder talk extensively about renowned family therapist Virginia Satir, one of the original contributors/models of the Meta Model. They note that one of her classic verbal therapeutic patterns is, “How do you feel about feeling that?”

When you take someone from thinking about a specific feeling and go “up” a level for them to consider how they feel about that feeling, you’re changing their reference. For example, a subject says that they’re feeling excited about getting to play with you, and you ask them, “How do you feel about feeling excited?” This causes them to shift their attention inward and make some judgments -- these could be abstract thoughts about what they feel is the “right” thing to feel in this situation, it could cause them to analyze exactly what that feeling of excitement is like, they could be thinking about their own identity and self-image in their map of the world, and much more.

This is of course a very hypnotic thing in and of itself (shifting internally or shifting frames of reference/chunks), but we can glean more from it. Hall writes:

“Satir had said that any answer to the question, ‘How do you feel about feeling X?’ results in articulating the person’s ‘self-esteem.’”

He goes on to quote Bandler and Grinder from “The Structure of Magic,” where they say:

“Changes at this level -- the level of self esteem -- are extremely important, since a person’s self-image affects the way a person organizes his entire experience or reference structure permeate the client’s entire model of the world.”

The Meta Model, which seeks to clarify and specify generalizations, deletions, and distortions, can be seen as a way to “chunk down” information so it is more clear to the parties involved. But it can also be used to “chunk up” or cause someone to see things through a Meta State as described by this model.

When someone is in a broader or more analytical frame of reference about themselves, it could become easier to make changes and there may be more options available to both parties. This is notably useful in a brainwashing context; if you have someone thinking about the way that they feel about themselves, they’re in some ways dissociated from the reality, and you can play with changing not only aspects of them or their behavior but also how they feel about those changes -- again, an issue of self-image, which becomes rather persistent.

Korzybski, General Semantics, and Further Language

Korzybski, as we discussed, is one of the primary sources for the Meta Model, but only his idea of Map/Territory was really attributed to him when it was borrowed. Hall and others dug into his work to see what else they could find that was useful to the kind of language and processing that the Meta Model works with.

Korzybski’s theory of General Semantics was an approach to language, therapy, philosophy, and psychology -- much like NLP itself. It was very much reactionary; “Aristotelian” systems of thought were all about absolutes, reality, and rigid identity. Purposefully contrasting to be “non-Aristotelian,” General Semantics looked to eschew this style of thinking and described it through science and language.

Hall summarizes this into three principles:

1. The Principle of Non-Identity. 

General Semantics says that you can’t say, “A thing is what it is,” or “A word means what it means.” Objectivity is not a realistic concept, especially since we represent our experiences through processes, patterns, and language.

1. The Principle of Contradiction

Relativity is an essential concept when trying to discern whether something “is not” something. Trying to contradict something, like whether a glass is not full, is dependent on our frame of reference as well as generally being about degrees than a straight “yes” or “no.”

1. The Principle of the Middles

Boolean things are arguably non-existent; we live in a world where we must understand that there are almost always shades of gray from some perspective. That could be about the knowledge we have, the context we’re in, or any of the other myriad of variables that affect us and exist in the world.

These principles were emphasized in different ways in early NLP and are largely important to the practice. NLP values the knowledge that someone’s subjective truths of the world are necessarily different from anyone else’s. The Meta Model took this to heart and offered a linguistic view into how to see some of those differences -- but so did Korzybski, which Hall adapted into a further set of language artifacts to look for in speech to add onto the existing Meta Model.

Extended Meta Model Violations/Questions

Over/Under Defined Terms

Words that are abstract in nature when discussing quality or other attributes. They are “over defined” when we take them at dictionary value and assume objective truth, and “under defined” because they do not tell a complete story of the situation.

Example: “What’s the best way to hypnotize someone?”

Clarifying: Attempt to get some sort of solid basis for what the words could mean, like, “What kind of evidence would tell you that one way is ‘best?’” You can also challenge the presuppositions involved: “Why do you think there is one ‘best’ method?”

Delusional Verbal Splits

Language that bifurcates or compartmentalizes things in such a way that the fact that they are parts of a whole gets lost. Words like “body and mind,” “my brain and I,” and “parts” can indicate that someone is making a split that does not represent reality.

Example: “My kinesthetic stuff isn’t as strong as my visual stuff.”

Clarifying: Question the categorizing involved, display the whole, or try combining the two. “Are they really that separate? Aren’t your kinesthetic responses and visual responses just a part of your brain’s process? Aren’t there visual aspects to kinesthetic things and vice versa?”

Either/Or Phrases

This can be thought of as a sort of double bind -- language that implies that there are limited options when in reality there are more. “If,” “then,” “either,” or “or” can represent this sort of restriction, but pay attention to what is being communicated.

Example: “Should we do some bimbo play? Or should we do robots, instead?”

Clarifying: Test for reality and look for other options, explore the gradient, or look for ways to break the assumption there is a rigid course of action. “Does anything else come to mind? What kinds of other things are connected to those or different? What if we did both?”

Multiordinality

This is a type of nominalization that happens when a word is generalized to the point that its meaning can be shifted to apply even to itself. Think about words that are nominalized that have a lot of variance in what their quality could be, like “love,” “thoughts,” or “happiness.”

Example: “I’m stuck thinking about my thinking.”

Clarifying: Attempt to qualify or ask for reference. “What are those thoughts like? How are they different from the thoughts you’re thinking about?”

Static or Signal Words

This is a type of nominalization that occurs when words are used to imply definites or absolutes. There is a presupposition that it is a universal fact, even if the source is unknown. It is not necessarily about the specific words being used, but the implication of where they are from that then rigidly defines the nominalization.

Example: “This is just how being a subject is.”

Clarifying: Specify the lack of objectivity to reduce the absoluteness of the statement, and seek meaning. “What do you mean by ‘being a subject?’ Are there times where that quality changes?”

Pseudo-Words

This is a nominalization where language is invented to describe something that is not real. Think about if someone is using an expression to provide context, but the expression itself doesn’t refer to anything with objective meaning.

Example: “I feel completely empty.”

Clarifying: Reality test and attempt to specify what is actually happening. “What does emptiness feel like? What tells you that you’re empty?”

Identification

Identification violations happen when a sameness is drawn between two things in languages, but the differences are deleted. Words like “is,” “are,” “were,” and “am” are potential markers for this kind of equation.

Example: “I’m a challenging subject.”

Clarifying: Question the comparison and identify where they think the similarities are, and give them options to notice the differences. “What specifically makes you challenging? Aren’t there contexts and situations where that definition doesn’t fit?”

Personalizing

When someone implies that a fact or statement is targeted towards them, they could be personalizing. It could mean that they are connecting things to their self-image.

Example: “They said that they don’t like brats… They must not like playing with me.”

Clarifying: Dig into the cause/effect and offer alternatives. “Why do you think they were referring to you? Do you think maybe that’s not what they meant? Isn’t there evidence to the contrary?”

Metaphors

Metaphors are common language ingredients that draw comparisons between concepts without using connecting words such as “like.” However, information can be distorted or lost in those comparisons.

Example: “I feel so foggy...”

Clarifying: Explore the metaphor; you can also try to deconstruct it. “What does that fogginess feel like or represent? What else do you feel? Are there other words that describe what you’re experiencing?”

In Conclusion

NLP can be confusing because it is a complicated mesh of concepts reorganized and renamed -- surely, some of this is stuff that hypnotists know and do intuitively. But as the original Meta group found value in picking apart and analyzing “normal” communication, we can follow their model and find what is useful for ourselves.

We should think about the Meta Model not only as a goal-oriented way to clarify information, but a way to think about how language could correspond to the way that we think. As hypnokinksters, this is an essential part of our practice, and as we keep exploring, we’ll learn even more about how language plays a part in achieving enjoyable, hot scenes.

Bibliography

Bandler, R., & Grinder, J. (1975). The Structure of Magic I: A Book about Language and Therapy. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.

Bandler, R., & Grinder, J. (1976). The Structure of Magic II: A Book about Communication and Change. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.

Grinder, J., & Pucelik, R. F. (2013). The Origins of Neuro Linguistic Programming. Carmarthen: Crown House Pub.

Hall, L. M. (2001). Communication Magic: Exploring the Structure and Meaning of Language. Carmarthen, Wales: Crown House Pub.

Hall, L. M. (2016, August 8). Korzybski's Contributions to NLP. Retrieved from https://www.nlp.ch/pdfdocs/Historie_Korzybskis_Contributions_to_NLP.pdf

Hoag, J. D. (2008, February 04). The NLP Meta Model. Retrieved June 19, 2020, from http://www.nlpls.com/articles/NLPmetaModel.php