Paveway II Delivery Profiles - Intermède (2/2)

Do you remember that video?

I had only one comment, but it was overall correct.

"Wasn't the bomb dropped too late, resulting in a miss because the seeker couldn't capture the laser on time? If this is the case, could the laser have been pointed further than the target to help the bomb acquire the laser then bring back the laser on target?

Also, a B-1B briefly obstructed the view. I take this was not intended and somebody said oh shit in the cockpit? Was the lack of proper deconfliction ever debriefed? I heard back in the days of Operation Allied Force, information would not flow easily between various units, even within the same air force. Hopefully things had changed by OEF."

Regarding the bomb impact:

As observed, the impact point does not coincide exactly with the TGP’s laser spot. However, the impact remains within the expected Circular Error Probable (CEP) for this class of weapon.

We introduced the concept of CEP in the Runway Attack series, but to recap: CEP represents the radius within which 50% of weapon impacts will occur, accounting for all contributing errors (aircraft systems, sensors, weapon guidance, and ballistic factors). For the Paveway II, the design CEP was approximately 10 meters, though in operational use it proved significantly more accurate. An impact 10 meters from the aimpoint is therefore considered well within normal precision. At the same time, it must be understood that 50% of weapons are expected to fall outside that distance.

In this case, the lack of distinct terrain features makes it difficult to measure the offset precisely, but the error appears to be several times the CEP. For a Paveway II, this would be considered a poor result. However, the weapon employed here was not a Paveway II but a Laser Guided Training Round (LGTR), which inherently has a larger CEP. Within that context, the result falls within expectations for that training ordnance.

Accordingly, the initial remark is not accurate: the release was executed correctly, and the outcome is consistent with the known performance of the LGTR.

Official Paveway II factsheet showcasing GBU-12's CEP at 3.6 ft...

On the second point:

More noteworthy is the presence of a B-1B passing through the TGP field of view over the target immediately after weapon impact. This indicates that the aircraft flew dangerously close to the bomb’s trajectory, an entirely unintended and unacceptable occurrence. In other words, there was a serious deconfliction failure.

The most fundamental deconfliction method is vertical separation: no aircraft is permitted to fly below the shooter along the weapon’s trajectory, with an additional horizontal buffer applied for safety.

The simplest enforcement technique is to establish a restricted buffer zone around the target area (several nautical miles in radius) where no other aircraft may enter during the strike. If such a wide exclusion zone is impractical, more refined measures can be used. Airspace can be segregated using:

• geographic references (e.g., “remain east of grid 42 S QQ E22” or “east of E065°32.50’”),

• visual references (e.g., “remain east of the river”),

• procedural references (e.g., “remain east of the IP” or "remain east of 81CJ6" using CGRS grids).

Time control is also critical. These restrictions must only be in effect for the specific window of weapons employment. Crews must remember that the fragmentation hazard persists for roughly 30 seconds after impact, until all fragments have returned to the ground.

Here, several JTACs were operating in close proximity. The B-1 crew failed to comply with established horizontal deconfliction procedures and ultimately flew dangerously close to the target area, without understanding that an attack was in progress. Fortunately, this occurred in training and did not result in serious consequences.

The incident was thoroughly debriefed and has since served as a clear reminder to all participants of the importance of strict adherence to deconfliction measures. Failure to do so in combat could result in catastrophic fratricide, and no crew wants to be remembered as the one taken down by a friendly GBU-12...

This incident took place during a Green Flag exercise, near Nellis AFB.