Russian- Ukraine War Flash Report - July 09, 2023 14:45 PDT - Rumors, Rumors, Rumors

Rumor Number One

Multiple Russian sources are reporting Chief of Staff, and Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine Valery Gerasimov has been relieved of command. Reportedly the decision happened shortly after the Azov commanders had been released by Türkiye. He has reportedly been replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Teplinskiy. The root of the claims comes from Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar but has been repeated by other sources.

Confidence: Moderate

When Gerasimov replaced General of the Army Sergey Surovikin on January 11, we noted that the average tenure for the Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine was averaging around 90 days. We also predicted that Gerasimov would last more than 90 days, but if he did not create significant success on the battlefield, the Kremlin would be painted into a corner on how to handle his failure. We also assessed that of anyone put in the role, Gerasimov had numerous exit paths. Retirement from his job, needing to step back due to complications from his April 30, 2022 injury, which reduced his profile dramatically, a new role within the Kremlin, or the always reliable, more time with family.

Twist: If it's true, the biggest winner is Yevgeny Prigozhin. His stated main goal of the June 23 - 24 insurrection was to remove Valery Gerasimov and Sergei Shoigu. If this change is true, it is a somewhat bad look for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who gave into a "traitor's" demands.

Who is Mikhail Teplinskiy? Does it matter? Not snark - history has shown he'll last 90ish days in the role. He is being handed a mess if the reports are true. Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 8 kilometers in depth in at least three locations after adjusting tactics. The situation on the southern flank of Bakhmut is becoming critical. There are an increasing number of videos showing Russian artillery and MLRS positions at the Surovikin Line in the south and the Prigozhin Line in the east being destroyed by counterbattery. There are repeated complaints by Russian units of logistic problems with food becoming a major issue. 

Mini Rumor: The Russian Ministry of Defense terminated its contract with Concord Holdings on June 30, the company that feeds the Russian military. Is it true that they did this with no plan in place for a replacement? Yes, it's true, and this is likely a major reason, if not the reason, why there has been a rash of Russian units declaring they are no longer receiving rations and potable water. 

Is Gerasimov completely out? According to Rybar, no, he is still the Chief of Staff and was only removed as the Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine.

How does this impact Ukraine? This is a bit tough to assess because of all of the dimensions.

Path One - Gerasimov is out as Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine but remains the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: This is the best outcome for Ukraine. The change in command will produce a short operational pause of 4 to 14 days based on past history because the Russian command structure is top-down. Ukrainian forces can capitalize on this. Second, Gerasimov is corrupt and incompetent. His remaining as the Chief of Staff leaves an incompetent person in charge.

Path Two - Gerasimov is out as Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine and out as the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: The issue of the change of command forcing a Russian operational pause stands. The question becomes, who replaces him as Chief of Staff, how autonomous will they be, and how do they align with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu? 

Path Three - Rybar just made it up or got burned by bad information, and there is no change. Gerasimov has been almost invisible since he was wounded outside of Izyum on April 30, 2022, and hasn't attended numerous high-profile meetings and events. This includes Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in 2022 and 2023 and the emergency staff meeting after Prigozhin's failed insurrection. Because Russian communications to units below the company level remain broken, and many Russian troops on the forward line of friendly troops (FLOT - zero line) rely on their cellphones for information. Rumors of a change of command just a day after the release of the Azov commanders and two weeks after Prigozhin's insurrection is another hit to morale. 

Twist Two: If Gersaimov is out in any capacity, what happens to his deputy, Surovikin? The Russian general has not been seen since the morning of June 24, when he made a video appealing for Prigozhin to stop his insurrection. It is still too early to declare Surovikin persona not grata officially, but the clock is running. 

Rumor Number Two

With the Russian Federation completely disinterested in renewing the Black Sea Fleet and having implemented a de facto blockade of commercial traffic in and out of Ukrainian ports anyway, rumors are swirling that Türkiye and Ukraine will continue the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) without Russia.

Confidence: High

After Ukraine attacked the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol on October 29, 2022, using uncrewed surface vessels (USV), Russia withdrew from the BSGI on October 30. Ukraine, Türkiye, and the United Nations shrugged and ran the Russian blockade three days in a row, with Türkiye escorting the vessels leaving Odesa. Russia did nothing, and three days later, in what was to that point the biggest embarrassment for the Kremlin on its ability to project power, returned to the BSGI and demanded "security guarantees" from Ukraine. 

In May, the Kremlin refused to renew the BSGI for 120 days, instead stretching it to 60. They again demanded that ammonia shipments through a Ukrainian pipeline restart in order to renew the agreement. Ukraine agreed, and two days later, Russia blew up the pipeline. 

Then Russia demanded that at least one bank be permitted to take payments through SWIFT for grain shipments, or they would not renew. We didn't report on this situation because first, we're vehemently against it, and second, we're trying to avoid some hot-button topic at the moment. The West agreed, and Russia said forget we asked.

Yesterday, Russian milbloggers were calling out the Kremlin's decision, saying that the actions from Moscow indicate that their concerns were never about supporting African nation partners but the economic motivation to sell fertilizer. This while simultaneously criticizing the BSGI in the first place. To say that the Russian information space is going through some things right now is an understatement.

It is rumored that Türkiye is telling partners they will continue to support the grain shipments with or without Russia. Certainly, port traffic is a revenue generator, so Ankara has its own motivations.

What about insurance for transiting vessels through a war zone? Ukraine has said they are willing to underwrite insurance policies for the carriers that continue to transit grain and established a structure for this last year.

Twist: If Russia withdraws from the BSGI, the biggest issue is that port infrastructure can be targeted, and the Russian Federation has repeatedly demonstrated they don't care about civil infrastructure or foreign-flagged vessels. Ukrainian air defense in Odesa cannot stop certain missiles, such as the Kh-22 when it enters its ballistic phase, the Iskander-K and the Iskander-M, and the Kh-47 air-to-surface ballistic missile. 

Twist Two: Ponder this. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to Snake Island by boat after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and during a period of unusual thunderstorm activity. The waters of the Black Sea are churned up with debris, munitions, and untethered sea mines. His visit demonstrated more than strong leadership and a willingness to take risks that he is asking his own people to take. It demonstrated that Russia has absolutely no control of the western part of the Black Sea. Travel to Snake Island is either so common that the Russian Navy is completely ignoring it, or they have no confidence in their ability to interdict vessels, or they are incapable of projecting power. 

Twist Three: The release of the Azov commanders without even a courtesy call to Moscow when they were on the ramp at the airport sends a strong message that Türkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is playing some 3D chess. We have maintained since October 2022 that Erdoğan wants to extend his ability to project power in the Black Sea. What better way to say, "This is my bathtub," than escorting civilian cargo ships full of grain and edible oils that reduced global inflation on foodstuffs by 22%.

Twist Four: Today, Ankara has asked that its application for the European Union be reconsidered and moved forward on an expedited basis.

What's next? Currently, there is no official statement from anyone, and the issue of insurance for vessels has to be addressed. As we assessed in April 2022, the role the heavy missile cruiser Moskva played was providing air defense to the Black Sea Fleet. It was incapable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles and instead bristled with air defense and antiship weapons. Russia then converted Snake Island into a fixed "Moskva" to continue to protect the Black Sea Fleet, which stood off from the Ukrainian coast. The loss of Snake Island is a so-called "goodwill gesture" on June 30, neutralized the ability of the Black Sea Fleet to project power. Ukraine's creation and use of USVs further limited Black Sea Fleet operations.

Rumor Number Three

A video showing a large convoy of military vehicles and personnel was reportedly Private Military Company Wagner Group mercenaries in Belarus moving to their new home.

Confidence: Low

We've watched the video multiple times and didn't see any Russian invasion markings on any of the vehicles, and more critically, a red stripe, which is now the PMC Wagner IFF marker. There was a Pantsir air defense system with its radar active in the video. This is unusual for three reasons. First, there were multiple reports that PMC Wagner surrendered much of their heavy equipment at the end of June. Second, why would PMC Wagner need to be operating air defense systems within Belarus? Third, the stopped convoy is exhibiting no military discipline, parked nose-to-tail on the side of a very busy highway. This does not align with PMC Wagner's tactics and would not align with any troop movements in the current environment, especially if they are concerned about air strikes. Finally, Russian state media ran a report showing the new tent encampment in Belarus, which was empty and didn't appear to offer accommodations for a long-term occupation. 

Ukrainian and Western intelligence, and some Russian sources, report that PMC Wagner fighters remain in occupied Luhansk, with Prigozhin spinning the situation as everyone is on vacation into August.