Russian- Ukraine War Flash Report - July 07, 2023 13:30 PDT - Silence, Requesting Silence

Ukrainian officials have asked journalists, analysts, and OSINT for operational security.

For those who weren't Patreons in October, a similar request was made, including a direct request from the Ukrainian government. We suspended updating the war map for about two weeks, only repeated public combat reports, and curtailed geolocation work, even if it was in the public domain.

During June, Ukrainian forces advanced up to 8 kilometers in depth in three areas of operation. Russian military doctrine dictates a strong defensive line of up to 10 kilometers in depth, with the first and second echelons blurred. Behind that is generally not built up. In this case, in some areas of Ukraine, the next line is 15 to 20 kilometers behind - the Surovikin Line.

Russia has been furiously defending the existing line of conflict despite stronger defensive positions 20 to 30 kilometers in the rear. These defensive lines are under tremendous strain in several areas.

Ukrainian forces have been conducting significant counterbattery activity, reflected in the equipment losses table updated yesterday, videos we've shared, and the use of HIMARS to destroy firebases. "By the book," Ukraine is close to being able to attempt a breakthrough in three areas, and activity by the Ukrainian military points to something coming.

Unlike July - September 2022, when we had specific intelligence in the Izyum area that informed our analysis, we don't have trusted sources in occupied Zaporizhia, and our key contact in the Donbas went missing in May 2022 and was able to cross into free Ukraine at the start of the year. We never revealed the information shared with us to protect OPSEC and, more critically, the safety of our contacts, but we did use that information to inform our analysis.

In the case of Kherson, our experience with military doctrine made the situation easy for our team to interpret. Ukraine opted to destroy Russian ground and sea lines of communication (GLOC/SLOC - supply lines) to starve out the occupation force west of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Mykolaiv. Once the bridges were successfully interdicted and the river was largely under fire control, a Russian withdrawal or collapse was inevitable. 

It has felt to the team "something is coming," which is hard to articulate in a Situation Report, which is focused on facts, not feelings (sorry for the cliché). We have repeatedly stated the ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations are shaping and subordinate attacks to the main push.

What we can't say with any confidence is that the main push will be - here. Even if we had high confidence and a firm case, we wouldn't share it to respect OPSEC. We haven't shared where we think the main offensive will be, but I can say the prediction in the TikTok envelope is still in play.

In no particular order and with no da Vinci Code hints, areas to watch, and our high-level thoughts,

• Kreminna area of operation - Russians seem convinced this is an area of concern with them removing then returning reserve units. The argument against this is an advance here is more of a political victory and doesn't impact the Crimean land bridge.
• Soledar/Bakhmut area of operation - this is the obvious choice given Ukraine has had the most success in this area recently, but the argument against this is this work is largely being done by two brigades using superior tactics and taking advantage of the terrain. It is quite possible Ukrainian force can achieve a breakthrough here without committing the main force. Also, the main offensive here would be a political victory, not a strategic one. 
• Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka operational direction - advance on Mariupol and/or Berdyansk would sever the Crimean land bridge, which would significantly complicate Russian military operations and logistics entering the winter. The argument against this is the complexity of advancing 80-plus kilometers by October and laying siege to a city or cities. 
• Orikhiv area of operation - advance on Melitopol is the shortest distance to cut the Crimean land bridge and is almost certainly the most heavily defended area. Up to 150,000 Russian troops are located in Zaporizhia and the landmine density rivals places like the South-North Korean DMZ and around Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Ukrainian forces have been conducting significant shaping operations from Zherebyanky to Novopokrovka, conducting between 1,100 to 1,500 fire missions a day for almost three weeks and significant work to interdict Russian personnel, heavy equipment, and critical supplies deep behind the line of conflict. The argument against this is the "obvious" location, and based on prior history, Ukraine has not attacked the "obvious" when the obvious will be a meat grinder. That's why Russia has this area so heavily defended with the deepest defensive lines and largest reserve forces. There is a significant argument that Russian forces are currently locked in place.

Are there possibilities not being considered? 

Yes. We maintain that a wet crossing of the mud flats of the former Kakhovka Reservoir and a wet crossing of the Dnipro involving multiple Ukrainian brigades feels far-fetched. However, the activity around Dachi has revealed that Russian forces lack a coordinated quick response force, and the flooding shredded their defensive lines. A company of Ukrainian troops spread over tens of kilometers has resulted in the visually confirmed destruction of 23 Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and dozens of dead Russian troops. Ukrainian counterbattery efforts have been absolutely devastating, while Russian artillery continues to focus on attacking civilians, exposing their firebases to more Ukrainian counterbattery. It would be wrong to dismiss this as a possibility. It is also the shortest distance to sever the Crimean land bridge. The argument against this is the 150,000 Russian troops parked in Zaporizhia that could be quickly relocated to stop a Ukrainian advance. Also, wet crossings are as dangerous and complicated as breaching attempts through minefields.

To honor the request from the Ukrainian government, we will pull back on some analysis in areas of operation where it isn't as obvious as Klishchiivka. There has been no request to cease map updates, but we will follow what we did late in late October 2020, which is only using widely publicly distributed videos and pictures for geolocation and liberal use of gray zones.

Ukraine adapted its tactics to the realities of the battlefield and its existing capabilities in the second half of June and has become more effective. There are significant shaping operations that are ongoing. Russian reserve units meant for the Surovikin Line in the south and Prigozhin Line in the east have been activated and moved up to prevent further Ukrainian advances. There has been a significant increase in Ukrainian counterbattery fire and targeting of Russian electronic warfare and monitoring capabilities. There are a couple of other things we do know that we won't share to respect OPSEC - but I can't stress enough - no, "A-has!"

If we could summarize Ukrainian operations in June 2023, we would call it Operational Razzle Dazzle. Where is the main push going to strike? We believe there is a real possibility we will know by the middle of the month, and Ukrainian commanders have done an excellent job of planting the seeds of fear, uncertainty, and doubt within the Russian Ministry of Defense. The loss of PMC Wagner and the ongoing political infighting after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection will further complicate Moscow's ability to synthesize its intelligence.