NEW VIDEO! How do you know that you know what you know?
Added 2022-08-04 13:37:27 +0000 UTCTrying out some philosophy. Hope you like it!
Comments
When you hear a bump in the night, you know that the sound picked up by your ears can have many possible sources. Each of the ways of bringing the same sound effect to your ears becomes an element in an equivalence class of setups that produce the same sound. To pair down the initial range of plausible setups, one describes in classical terms what Bohr would call the experimental setup. A recorded sound becomes art and part of the whole experimental setup. Any given sound can be traced back, yet not uniquely, to circumstances and conditions for its creation and reception. A sound gives one suggestive ideas for its source, yet any pattern can be filled in with high order virtual processes that intervene in the middle without changing what you can discriminate with your ears. Potential setups can be partitioned into equivalence classes in which each class gives a particular sound. The classes get labeled by their eigenvalues. A specific setup precludes others which lie in a rich land of conjugate variables that can not appear because the experimental setup for one variable precludes setting up for its conjugate twin. Where one variable may be in a well defined and repeatable state, its conjugate twin can be on holiday and nowhere to be found.
Scott Ready
2022-08-11 16:30:40 +0000 UTCI'm glad you still got something out of this video! Hmm that's an interesting point I hadn't come across. I think The Gettier Problem opens up a whole bunch of questions about what the nature of truth and perspective are, and how "objective" truths applies to our definition of knowledge. The current definitions are definitely too vague, but I think that's because for a long time there was no real need to make them more concrete. Hopefully with all of this advancement in AI, that will change and future humanity will have a rigorous definition for what it means to know something.
Up and Atom
2022-08-10 17:19:55 +0000 UTCThe video reminds me of self-differentiable qualia, in a semiotic space, known as a semiosphere.
Rickey Estes
2022-08-09 03:30:39 +0000 UTCJade, Although I am already very familiar with Gettier examples, I still learned something new from this video, namely, that an AI wrote a musical! I will be contemplating the implications of that accomplishment for a long time. In the video, you discussed multiple attempts to solve the problem that Gettier and his Buddhist predecessor identified and explained why all of them are inadequate. There is a solution you did not mention, however, and that solution proceeds by pointing out a flaw within Gettier examples themselves. Several philosophers have noticed that the true proposition the person in each Gettier example allegedly believes contains at least one vague referent. In other words, in each example, it is unclear to whom or to what the true proposition refers. Consequently, the true proposition that the person supposedly is justified believing in each example can be interpreted in more than one way, and there is no interpretation of that proposition in any example that would make the proposition both true and justified for that person to believe. Since the person in a Gettier example does not have a justified true belief in that example, that person does not have a justified true belief without knowledge in that example either. Gettier examples do not show that a person’s justified true beliefs are insufficient for knowledge because they do not depict that person as having justified true beliefs. Consider the first Gettier example you mentioned in your video, which involved your belief that the proposition “A sheep is in the field” is true. For this proposition to be true, the word “sheep” must refer to the sheep hiding in the bush. If the word “sheep” refers to the sheep in the bush, then the proposition “A sheep is in the field” does not accurately describe your belief, because you do not believe that a sheep is hiding in the bush. To describe your belief accurately, the word “sheep” in the proposition “A sheep is in the field” must refer to the woolly dog. Because a woolly dog is not a sheep, however, “A sheep is in the field” is no longer true when it is interpreted in this way. There is no interpretation of “A sheep is in the field” that would make that proposition both true and a belief that you were justified in having. The sheep example you discuss fails to show that you had the justified true belief that a sheep is in the field without knowing that proposition because it fails to show that you had a justified true belief that a sheep is in the field. For an excellent example of this type of objection, see Mizrahi, Moti. “Why Gettier Cases are Misleading.” Logos & Episteme, Vol. VII, No. 1 (2016): 31-44.
Rigid Designator
2022-08-07 01:35:28 +0000 UTC
