February 4th, 2022: CBA, Best Decisions Since 2017, Mailbag

Lockout, Day 65: Shohei Ohtani will be on the cover of MLB The Show 22 (a no-brainer) and I can’t believe it won’t be a hologram cover with him hitting when you look at it one way and pitching when you look at it the other. What a missed opportunity. I am willing to be Sony’s ideas guy for $450,000 a year plus expenses. Anyway, let’s get to today’s post.

1. The latest on CBA talks (and my Top 30 Prospects list). MLB and the MLBPA held another bargaining session earlier this week. The union responded to MLB’s latest proposal and talks were said to be “heated,” which they’re supposed to be, right? This is an adversarial relationship. Each side is trying to take money out of the other’s pocket. They’re not supposed to hold hands and sing Kumbaya.

Anyway, the MLBPA tweaked some things in their latest proposal, then MLB requested a federal mediator. They did that during the 1994-95 strike and it didn’t help. This is voluntary and the MLBPA can decline to participate, and labor lawyer Eugene Freedman says calling in a mediator now seems premature given how little the two sides have actually bargained. Shrugs. 

(As I understand it, calling in a mediator could also be MLB's way of nudging a few owners and subtly letting them know they need to move on certain items to get a deal done. Either way, the owners calling in the feds to mediate the lockout they started and could lift at any time is rich.)

It’s clear Spring Training isn’t starting on time. That looked to be the case the last few weeks given MLB’s slow playing of negotiations, but it is no less aggravating. Pitchers and catchers are supposed to report in about 10 days and it won’t happen. There’s still plenty of time to work out a deal before Opening Day is in jeopardy. I strongly recommend not riding the highs and lows of each little bit of news. This is all out of our control, so just sit back and breathe.

Because we don’t know when this cursed lockout will end, I’ve decided to publish my annual Top 30 Yankees Prospects list next Friday, Feb. 11th. I thought about holding it back until after the lockout because I like to cover all offseason trades and acquisitions in my list, but we just don’t know when the lockout will end. I don’t want to hold my list back indefinitely.

Next Friday was supposed to be the Friday before pitchers and catchers report, which is when I usually run my list each year. I’m going to stick to that, and if the Yankees go bonkers after the lockout and trade away (or trade for) a bunch of prospects, we can update the list or something. We’ll figure that out later. For now, I don’t see a good reason to wait to publish it.

So, the top 30 list next Friday means Friday’s regularly scheduled post will instead run Thursday, and will include my annual Not Top 30 Prospects. Beyond that, Thursday’s post will probably be a little shorter than usual because the top 30 is coming, and because there’s absolutely nothing happening during the lockout. Sound good? Prospects stuff coming next week.

2. Five best decisions of the last five years. The folks at Pinstripe Alley are running a series looking at the Yankees’ 25 smartest moves of the last 25 years. Subscriber Andrew H suggested I look at the 25 biggest blunders of the last 25 years (gee, I wonder what No. 1 is?), and although that’s a little too much negativity for me, I won’t look gift content in the mouth during the lockout.

Rather than go through the 25 dumbest moves of the last 25 years, what I will instead do is look at the five best and five worst decisions of the last five years. The last five years cover what we'll call the Aaron Judge era. We’re going to look at the best and worst decisions made during the current championship window, which of course has not yet yielded a championship.

Today we’re going to tackle the five best decisions and next time we’ll cover the five worst. I am intentionally going with “decision” instead of “move” here because not making a move can be quite impactful sometimes (either good or bad), and at some point a decision was made to not make that move. Those decisions should be acknowledged as well. They’re important.

We’ve evaluating these decisions in hindsight. There’s value in evaluating things based only on what we knew at the time they were made, but it’s also instructive to look at how everything played out after the fact. How else do you learn from your mistakes? This list is highly subjective, so if you disagree with something, please know I do not care (I kid, I kid). Let’s get to it.

5. Passing on Corbin

I badly wanted the Yankees to sign Patrick Corbin during the 2018-19 offseason. Corbin, then 28, was coming off an excellent year, throwing 200 innings with a 3.15 ERA (2.47 FIP) and a 30.8% strikeout rate with the Diamondbacks. His slider rated as one of the best pitches in baseball. This was the Yankees’ rotation at the time:

1. RHP Luis Severino (awesome the previous two years)
2. RHP Masahiro Tanaka (steady and reliable)
3. LHP CC Sabathia (nearing the end of the line)
4. RHP Sonny Gray (he was obviously going to be traded that offseason)
5. RHP Domingo German (5.57 ERA in 85.2 innings in 2018)
6. LHP Jordan Montgomery (likely to miss most of 2019 with Tommy John surgery)

Corbin is a native New Yorker (he’s from up near Syracuse) who practically screamed from the rooftops that he wanted to be a Yankee that offseason. “(It) would definitely be great to play (for the Yankees). I grew up a Yankees fan. My whole family are Yankees fans,” he said. The Yankees wined and dined Corbin, floated 4-5 years at $17M to $20M per year, and that was it.

A few weeks later Corbin signed a six-year, $140M contract with the Nationals, and he was great in 2019! He posted a 3.25 ERA (3.49 FIP) with a 28.5% strikeout rate in 202 innings, then pitched in eight of Washington’s 17 postseason games (five starts and three relief appearances). That includes three shutout innings in relief to get the win in Game 7 of the World Series.

In the two years since, Corbin has been one of the least effective pitchers in the game, throwing 237.1 innings with a 5.50 ERA (5.06 FIP) and a 19.4% strikeout rate. He is the 11th highest paid pitcher in baseball in terms of average annual value and has another three years to go on his deal. It is a massive albatross and one of the 4-5 worst contracts in the sport.

For the Nationals, who cares? Flags fly forever and Corbin played a major role in the franchise’s first ever World Series title. Maybe Corbin would have helped the Yankees win the World Series in 2019. It certainly would have been nicer to have him than J.A. Happ, and the Yankees had to start a gassed Chad Green in Game 6 of the ALCS that year. Corbin would’ve helped.

Given how bad Corbin has been the last two years and the likelihood that the Yankees don’t win the 2019 World Series with him* (because the odds are always against any one team winning the World Series), it’s a good thing the Yankees passed. His contract would have limited their ability to do other things in the austerity era, and they probably would have kept running him out there anyway, because that’s usually what teams do with big money players. They try to get their money’s worth no matter how ineffective the player. A bullet dodged, this is.

* The Yankees were two wins away from going to the 2019 World Series, not one, and it's not like this is a 2010 Cliff Lee situation, where the guy they tried to trade for knocked them out in October.

4. The Stanton trade

The trade wasn’t so much a masterstroke as it was the Yankees using their financial might as a blunt force object. The Marlins were slashing payroll and had worked out separate trades to send Giancarlo Stanton, the reigning NL MVP, to the Cardinals and Giants, but he used his no-trade clause to block them. He wanted to go to a big market team ready to win right away.

Stanton had just turned 28 and he was coming off a season in which he hit .281/.376/.631 (158 wRC+) with 59 homers. It is tied for the ninth highest single-season home run total in history, and during one stretch that year, Stanton hit 30 homers in 48 games. The game’s preeminent slugger was in his prime and the Marlins had no trade leverage at all. Remarkable, really.

Once the Cardinals and Giants were out of the picture, the market for Stanton was down to the Dodgers and Yankees, and Los Angeles never made a serious push because they didn’t want to take on a 10-year deal (and because they didn’t have the DH). At that point the Yankees could name their price. This was the result:

• To Yankees: OF Giancarlo Stanton and a conditional $30M
• To Marlins: IF Starlin Castro, IF Jose Devers, RHP Jorge Guzman

(The Yankees would only receive the $30M if Stanton declined to use his opt out following the 2020 season. He didn’t opt out, so the Yankees will get the money.)

For the price of two mid-range prospects the Yankees acquired the reigning NL MVP at what was the game’s 27th highest luxury tax hit at the time (currently 37th highest), and also dumped their $22M obligation to Castro while simultaneously opening second base for Gleyber Torres. Getting Stanton in his prime wasn’t enough. The Yankees also cleared a path for Gleyber.

The only reason I can’t rank this trade (this decision, more accurately) higher is the injuries, which were a known risk with Stanton at the time. He missed most of 2019 and has played only 338 of 546 possible regular season games since the trade, or 62%. Whenever he’s healthy though, Stanton is always productive. His Baseball Reference page is hitter porn:

Stanton played 158 games and was the Yankees’ best non-Judge player in 2018, and last year he played 139 games and was again their best non-Judge player. Giancarlo has stretches where he puts the team on his back in a way few other players can (like this), and he’s a .297/.373/.734 (185 wRC+) hitter with nine homers in 18 postseason games with the Yankees.

There are another six years to go on Stanton’s contract and he could go all Chris Davis at some point and become unplayable. If it happens, the Yankees will deal with it. The thinking behind the trade was getting an elite in-his-prime producer to help with the short-term championship push. Stanton has missed a lot of time but has contributed immensely to that cause overall. And all it cost was the low low price of not having to watch Starlin Castro anymore.

3. The White Sox trade

The Yankees weren’t expected to contend in 2017. Brian Cashman openly talked about it being a “transition” year, but then Judge began his assault on the rookie record books, Severino broke out as an ace, Didi Gregorius took a step forward, and others like Chad Green, Aaron Hicks, and Jordan Montgomery blossomed into key contributors. The Yankees arrived ahead of schedule.

Come July, the Yankees were hanging around the AL East race and they were definitely in the Wild Card race, but they also needed reinforcements. The offense was a bat short and the bullpen was shaky largely because Tyler Clippard was unexpectedly awful and Dellin Betances had a Bad Dellin year. On July 19th, the Yankees told the world they were going for it. The trade:

• To Yankees: 3B Todd Frazier, RHP Tommy Kahnle, RHP David Robertson
• To White Sox: LHP Ian Clarkin, RHP Tyler Clippard, OF Tito Polo, OF Blake Rutherford

The trade cost the Yankees their most recent first round pick (Rutherford), otherwise they didn’t give up anything they’d miss to add impact depth to the bullpen, and also lengthen the lineup and improve the infield defense. Chase Headley and his throwing issues moved over to first base, and the Yankees upgraded three MLB roster spots without subtracting anything notable.

Frazier was a productive rental (.365 OBP and 115 wRC+) who also galvanized the clubhouse with the “thumbs down” gimmick. Robertson was Robertson (i.e. excellent) and he was signed through 2018, so he wasn’t a rental. Kahnle was a long-term add too. He was under team control through 2020. It was a trade designed to help the Yankees win now and win later.

Robertson and Kahnle were great that postseason – Robertson set career highs in innings (3.1) and pitches (52) in the 2017 Wild Card Game, you may remember – and overall positives in the following years too. The Yankees didn’t miss Clippard and the three prospects they gave up have yet to reach the big leagues (Rutherford isn’t a top prospect but could still make it).

There was also a “message” component to this trade. The Yankees were good even though not many thought they would be, and this trade was the front office telling a young team “we believe in you and we’re going to get you the help you need.” It’s corny but it’s absolutely something that resonates. This trade marked the arrival of the Judge era Yankees as contenders.

2. Signing Cole

Similar to the Stanton trade, signing Gerrit Cole was not the Yankees out-foxing the competition. It was them dropping the hammer and telling other teams don’t waste your time, we’ll beat your best offer. It wasn’t an out of nowhere move either. I don’t think many people went into the 2018-19 offseason expecting the Yankees to trade for Stanton, but everyone knew they wanted Cole.

Negotiations reportedly started with a seven-year offer. Cole’s hometown Angels and Dodgers matched. The Yankees offered an eighth year. The Angels and Dodgers matched again. The Yankees then put the ninth year on the table, and that was that. The Angels and Dodgers bowed out, and I think the Yankees would’ve gone to 10 years* if necessary.

* The Yankees kinda did go to 10 years. Cole can opt out of his contract after the 2024 season, and the Yankees can void his decision by exercising a $36M club option for 2029. We’ll worry about that when the time comes, but if Cole’s still an ace after 2024, I gotta think he’ll use the opt out and pressure the Yankees to tack on the tenth year.

The nine-year, $324M deal is far and away the richest pitching contract in history in terms of total guarantee (Max Scherzer beat the average annual value this offseason) and Cole’s been worth every penny to date, even while dealing with the weirdness of the short pandemic season and foreign substance crackdown. Cole’s ranks the last two years (min. 150 innings for rate stats):

• Innings: 254.1 (sixth)
• ERA: 3.11 (19th, fourth best in the AL)
• FIP: 3.20 (13th, third best in the AL)
• K%: 33.2% (sixth)
• BB%: 5.7% (18th)
• K-BB%: 27.5% (fourth)
• WPA: +4.60 (fourth)
• fWAR: +6.7 (sixth)
• bWAR: +7.8 (third)

Cole has been, at worst, a top four pitcher in the American League the last two seasons, and it’s really more like a top four pitcher in all of baseball. There’s not much overlap among the pitchers who rank ahead of him in those categories. Cole and Scherzer are the only two who consistently rank near the top in those leaderboards (Jacob deGrom and Shane Bieber really lag in innings).

The hamstring injury and Wild Card Game put a damper on Cole’s 2021. He was great overall though, and deservedly finished second in the Cy Young voting. The Yankees brought Cole in to put them over the top and get them a title, and while it hasn’t happened yet, it’s not his fault. The Yankees definitely don’t make the postseason without Cole in 2021. Maybe not 2020 either.

The Yankees needed an ace after 2019 and an in-his-prime ace was available in free agency, so the Yankees opened their wallet and haven’t regretted it for a second (*nudges the Yankees to do the same with shortstop*). There’s a lot of years to go on Cole’s contract and maybe things go bad at some point. Up to this point, he’s been everything the Yankees wanted.

1. Signing LeMahieu

LeMahieu’s new six-year contract didn’t get off to a great start last year. His original two-year deal is in the conversation for the best free agent signing in Yankees history though. I don’t think that’s hyperbole, at least in terms of his production relative to his contract and not championships or whatever. Giving a player an affordable two-year deal ($24M total!) and getting two MVP caliber seasons in return is pretty much a once in a generation free agent success story.

The funny thing is almost no one liked the LeMahieu signing at the time. Daniel Murphy ($24M), Marwin Gonzalez ($21M), and Jed Lowrie ($20M) all signed two-year deals in the same range as LeMahieu that offseason and I’m sure we could easily find “the Yankees should have signed this guy instead of LeMahieu” takes. I know I was Team Marwin because of his versatility (Yikes with the capital-Y).

The underlying numbers on LeMahieu were outrageously good – it’s not a coincidence the very smart Dodgers and Rays were reportedly the runners up to sign him – as he combined elite exit velocity with elite contact ability and very good defense. The Yankees also bet he’d be able to handle first and third bases, and LeMahieu looked like he’d played those positions his entire life.

LeMahieu signed with the Yankees at age 30 and he hit .327/.375/.518 (136 wRC+) in Year 1 of the contract and .364/.421/.590 (177 wRC+) in Year 2, which was the shortened pandemic season. Here’s where LeMahieu ranked those two years (min. 600 plate appearances for rate stats):

• AVG: .336 (first)
• OBP: .386 (tenth)
• SLG: .536 (20th)
• wRC+: 146 (11th)
• K%: 12.7% (ninth)
• fWAR: +7.9 (11th)
• bWAR: +8.7 (eighth)

If situational stats are your thing, LeMahieu hit .386/.433/.557 (164 wRC+) with runners in scoring position and .339/.359/.500 (121 wRC+) in high leverage situations those years. He was a clutch god, especially in 2019, when it was more surprising when LeMahieu didn’t get the runner in than when he did. I hadn’t felt that way about a hitter since prime Derek Jeter and Bernie Williams.

Front office decisions get no better than signing LeMahieu. The Yankees turned a little two-year, $24M contract into a top 10-ish player (LeMahieu finished fourth in the MVP voting in 2019 and third in 2020), and it’s one of the most successful free agent signings of the century. We were all so collectively wrong about LeMahieu. (Even if you want to ding the Yankees for the new six-year deal, 2021 LeMahieu isn’t enough for me to bump 2019-20 LeMahieu down this list.)

Honorable Mentions

The top four on the list are pretty obvious, I think. We could quibble with the exact order, but those are the four best decisions the Yankees have made during the Judge era. There are quite a few candidates for the No. 5 spot, and several other notable decisions beyond that. Let’s quickly run through some honorable mentions, in no particular order.

The Voit trade. I considered putting this fifth. The Yankees turned two relievers into their starting first baseman for 2.5 years or so, plus Luke Voit led baseball in homers and received MVP votes in 2020. Gio Gallegos has been pretty good for St. Louis (Chasen Shreve not so much), so this was a win-win trade more than a lopsided deal. Voit has been a very nice find.

Acquiring Urshela. I also considered putting this fifth. The Yankees first acquired Gio Urshela in a cash trade with the Blue Jays in Aug. 2018, then re-signed him as a minor league free agent after the season. Miguel Andujar’s injury opened the door three games into 2019 and Urshela took the third base job, and put up two years that had him in the All-Star Game conversation.

Acquiring Britton. The last two years of Zack Britton’s contract are lost seasons due to injury, but he was very good after coming over at the 2018 trade deadline, and he threw 80.1 innings with a 1.90 ERA and a 75.8% ground ball rate from 2019-20. Britton probably doesn’t re-sign with the Yankees without the trade (he said he fell in love with the organization in 2018) and he was as good as any reliever in the game from 2019-20.

The Paxton trade. This one didn’t work out as well as hoped because James Paxton was hurt and ineffective in 2020. He was merely good in the first half of 2019 too, but he was excellent down the stretch and the Yankees’ undisputed No. 1 starter going into October. Given what we know now, the Yankees didn’t give up much to get Paxton (poor Justus Sheffield seems stuck in the vortex of Mariners prospect suck), and the trade was a net positive.

The Tauchman trades. The Yankees traded a fringe lefty reliever prospect (Phil Diehl) for Mike Tauchman, got the best season of his career in 2019, then flipped him for a better lefty reliever than the one they originally gave up to get him (Wandy Peralta). Neat.

The Maybin trade. Everyone’s favorite random Yankee. Injuries decimated the outfield in April 2019, so the Yankees made a cash trade with Cleveland to get Cameron Maybin, and he was a comfortably above-average player the rest of the season. The mother of all scrap heap pickups.

The McCutchen trade. The Yankees waited a little too long to replace the injured Judge in 2018, though being patient knocked the asking price for Andrew McCutchen down to nothing. In his month as a Yankee, Cutch authored a .253/.421/.471 (150 wRC+) batting line. Fun fact: McCutchen is the last August waiver trade in Yankees history. MLB got rid of them in 2019.

The Gil trade. This doesn’t belong on any top moves list yet, though I do want to mention it. In Spring Training 2018, the Yankees traded the eminently replacement Jake Cave to the Twins for Dominican Summer League righty Luis Gil, who has since blossomed into one of their top pitching prospects and someone poised to take on a larger role in the near future. There’s serious “turn nothing into something” potential here. (Gil put up +0.8 WAR in his six starts last year. Cave is at +1.8 WAR in four years with Minnesota.)

3. Rapid fire thoughts. Earlier this week FanGraphs posted the ZiPS projected 2022 American League standings. Here’s what it has for the AL East:

Awfully tight. There are still moves to come after the lockout (the Yankees will have someone at shortstop on Opening Day, I’m sure of it) and that’s a double-edged sword. Yeah, the Yankees will add players, but so can other teams. I’ve written a few times at CBS about Toronto’s potential to do something huge (Jose Ramirez? Ketel Marte?) given their payroll flexibility and surplus of high-end young catchers. The Blue Jays could make a significant trade and shift the balance of power in the division real quick. Also, projections always underrate the Rays because they’re so good at optimizing role players who are otherwise pretty blah on the surface. Projections are just projections, so whatever, but boy, seeing the top of the AL East packed so tightly doesn’t make me feel great. The Yankees really need to do something to improve their outlook after the lockout. Anthony Rizzo and some glove-only stopgap shortstop won’t move the needle much … And finally, the independent Frontier League announced a new extra innings “sudden death” rule. Last year they held a Home Run Derby rather than play extra innings and everyone hated it. This year, after playing a normal tenth inning, they’ll play one extra half-inning. The home team decides whether they want to hit or pitch, and a runner is placed at first base with no outs. If the runner scores, his team wins. If the runner doesn’t score, the pitching team wins. Run expectancy says you have roughly a 50/50 chance to score in the inning with a runner on first and no outs, so they have his calibrated correctly. I am all for crazy baseball ideas – I am one of maybe three people on Earth who likes the automatic runner in extras – and this seems like a lot of fun. It also brings the potential for a lot of analysis, because picking whether to hit or pitch will be based on who’s available in the bullpen, who’s due up, etc. This sudden death rule (it’s not really a “sudden death” style overtime but I’ll let it slide) will never happen in MLB, but in an independent league where teams don’t have the arms to play endless extra innings? Go nuts.

Mailbag Questions of the Week

Anonymous asks: What are the financial ramifications of the lockout for both the owners and players if games are missed? I’ve read different things about park revenues being impactful (or not) and things about tv contracts that could be difficult and expensive for owners. I’m guessing players don’t get paid - do they still have their medical benefits?

The players don’t get paid their salaries during the lockout. They do get paid signing bonuses and any deferred payments though. The Cubs owe Jason Heyward a $4M signing bonus payment on April 1st and the Nationals owe Max Scherzer a $15M deferred salary payment on July 1st. Top NHL players often structure their contracts with massive signing bonuses and small base salaries for this reason. That league has a lockout almost every time their Collective Bargaining Agreement is up.

(The Yankees have no signing bonus or deferred salary payments due. They tend to be very straightforward with their contracts, with the signing bonus upfront and no deferred payments. Giancarlo Stanton is the only player on the roster with a guaranteed contract inherited from another team, and his deal includes nothing like that.)

Ron Blum says the MLBPA is making $5,000 monthly stipends available to players. It’s not nearly as much as they’d make otherwise, but it is something. As for health insurance, the MLBPA sent out a memo saying “the PA will use funds from its reserves” to continue coverage during the season in the event of a lockout, according to Evan Drellich (subs. req’d).

As for the owners, Maury Brown says they lose pretty much all game revenue. No gate, no television, no sponsorships, no gambling, nothing. They still get secondary revenue (NYY Steak is still open, I’m sure the Cubs are still selling rooms at the hotel outside Wrigley Field, etc.) but no direct-from-baseball revenue. Games must be played to get television money, etc.

The owners would lose a lot of money each day during the lockout, but owners tend to be in this for the long haul, and they have a much longer runway to recoup any lost revenue. Players have relatively short careers and may never make up the money they lose during the lockout. The owners will make it all back eventually, putting them at a big advantage.

Dan asks: They say a walk is as good as a hit, even though a walk is only one base and a hit can be more than that.  The logic there would suggest that a hitter should accept a walk and his one base if that is what the pitcher gives him. So if in a separate situation, if the shift is on, and a hitter can easily bunt or hit a weak grounder the other way, and get a near guaranteed single base as a result, why not do it then? Why is a single base via walk better than a single base via bunt?

In the literal sense, a walk is as good as a hit only when the bases are loaded and it’s a walk-off situation. In that case it doesn’t matter if you walk or get a hit or whatever as long as the run scores to win the game. In every other situation, a hit (even a bunt hit) is better than a walk, because a hit can advance runners more than one base, the defense could make an error, etc.

Bunting for a hit is a) a thing hitters should do more often, and b) not easy to do. Both things are true. Imagine trying to bunt against, say, Aroldis Chapman? Given his occasionally extreme control issues and perpetually nasty stuff, are you more likely to reach base by squaring around to bunt, or by taking a proper at-bat? Even bunting against someone with good control, like Gerrit Cole or Jonathan Loaisiga, seems like it would be a nightmare.

Joey Gallo bunts against the shift as much as any hitter in the game. He had seven bunt hits last year, tied with Rockies speedster Garrett Hampson for the most in baseball. Statcast tells me Gallo attempted 25 bunts. That includes foul balls and bunts that were turned into outs (but not times he squared around to bunt and pulled back). Seven successful bunts hits on 25 attempts is a 28% success rate. Hampson is a speed guy who should be good at bunting. He had those seven bunt hits in 50 attempts, or 14%. The MLB average is around 19%. It ain’t easy.

I think there’s room for more bunting against the shift in baseball, especially in this high strikeout era. Hitters have to be smart about it – if the bases are empty and there’s two outs, Gallo should just swing away and try to put one in the upper deck – and I understand not wanting to take them away from what makes them who they are, but I think it can be done more often in a way that adds to the game and benefits the player and his team.

To answer the question, a single base on a walk is not better than a single base on a bunt. A single base on a bunt could become multiple bases because the fielder throws the ball away, etc. That doesn’t happen that often, but it does happen. A walk is one base with no possible chance for more. Bunting against the shift isn’t as easy as many broadcasters would lead you to believe, but I do think it is underutilized to some extent.

Nick asks: I know this won't happen while Aroldis Chapman is on the roster, but whenever his time in NY comes to an end would you like to see the team move toward more fluid bullpen roles? Or do you think there is still value in having a designated closer? As a follow up, is there either a financial incentive or disincentive (through arbitration) to having multiple guys getting saves? Would 3 guys with 10 saves each earn more in arbitration than 1 guy with 30 saves and two setup men?

I definitely think there’s value to having a set closer. When you have that one set guy in the ninth inning, it’s one less thing everyone has to worry about. Other relievers can cross an inning off their “when will I pitch tonight?” bingo card, the manager has one fewer inning to think about matchups, etc. The closer needs to be great. I’d rather mix and match than ride with a mediocre closer just for the sake of having a closer, but set great closer? Sure. I’m cool with it.

The 2019-20 offseason (the last pre-COVID offseason) gives us a pretty good cross section of arbitration-eligible relievers. Here are the notable non-Super Two relievers who were in their first year of arbitration that offseason:

• Edwin Diaz: $5.1M (135 career saves going into arbitration)
• Luke Jackson: $1.825M (19 career saves)
• Chad Green: $1.275M (three career saves)
• Miguel Castro: $1.05M (six career saves)

Financially, Diaz is basically as good as it gets for a reliever. The Mariners manipulated his service time in such a way that he narrowly missed out on being a Super Two, so he went into arbitration with 3.5 years of saves. He had also received Rookie of the Year, Cy Young, and MVP votes, and had gone to the All-Star Game. All that and he received a $5.1M salary in his first year of arbitration.

Green is sorta on the opposite end of the spectrum. He was about as good as a reliever can be without getting saves, awards votes, going to the All-Star Game, etc. Diaz took a 3.33 ERA (3.01 FIP) with a 38.8% strikeout rate in 249 innings into arbitration. Green had a 3.16 ERA (3.13 FIP) with a 33.3% strikeouts in 259.1 innings. The performance was very close, but Green didn’t have the saves and all that other stuff, and received 25% Diaz’s salary.

Diaz is a bit of a special case given all the accomplishments. Cody Allen was very good but not good enough to go to All-Star Games, get Cy Young votes, etc. He took 60 saves into arbitration and received $4.15M, more than three times as much as Green. If the priority is having as cheap a bullpen as possible, then spreading the saves around is the way to go. That one 30-saves guy will make 3-4 times as much as his setup man even with comparable per-inning performances.

(Send your requests for Tuesday's random Yankee series and questions for Friday's mailbag to RABmailbag at gmail dot com.)